BOOK REVIEWS.
TRIAL By JURY. A Brief Review of Its Origin, Development and Merits
and Practical Discussions on Actual Copduct of Jury Trials. By Robert von
Moschzisker, LL. D. Geo. T. Bisel Co., Philadelphia, 1922, pp. x, 452.
In his treatise on Trial By Jury, Chief Justice Moschziiker has made a
real contribution to legal literature and has supplied a need long felt by the
profession. His superior advantages of a long and varied experience as a
trial lawyer and a trial judge, and his many opportunities of observing trial
lawyers at their best and worst, seasoned by his later position as an appellate judge, have equipped him as no other author fias been equipped for
sane, sound and practical directions.
This work is an outgrowth of a series of lectures delivered by the
author to the law students of the University of Pennsylvania. The first
three chapters of the book are devoted to a brief summary of the early
forms of trial, which preceded and led up to trial by jury, as well as the
opinions and speculations of writers on the subject, concerning the origin
and development of the jury system. This admirable historical introduction is followed by eleven chapters in which the author deals in detail with the practical as well as the theoretical problems involved in the
actual conduct of a jury trial. Here the fullness and variety of the author's
knowledge are self-evident. However much he gives of this abundance, the
feeling is still there that an abundance remains, flowing from 'an unexhausted reservoir. Here, too, his analytical gifts are displayed at their best.
The system, order, conciseness and clearness of his treatment are unrivaled;
there is no fog, either of thought or of expression, dimming the pages. The
paragraph divisions appeal to the mind and hold it while the proper emphasis is maintained by admirable variations in type. The appendices, particularly the first, containing indices for use in determining the number of
peremptory challenges in criminal offences, are invaluable.
Aside from all this the text is so full of the atmosphere of the personso colored with the narrative of personal incidents and anecdotes is to impart to a book of practice the charm of literature illustrated by the memories of Westminster Hall, or our own court rooms redolent of the fame
and art of Choate and Johnson.
In one instance it might seem that the author has left a seed of mischief to work by giving prominence, in paragraph 329 of his book, to Hilands
V. Commonwealth, III Pa. 1, 5, without th. complete antidote of Justice
Mitchell's exhaustive and complete concurring opinion in Commonwealth v.
McManus, 143 Pa. 85. In the former case Chief Justice Mercur reiterated
the rule laid down by Chief Justice Sharswood in Kane v. Commonwealth,
89 Pa. 522, that jurors in a criminal case "are not only judges of the facts
. . . but also of the law." Chief Justice Moschzisker, however, since the
publication of his book, has effectively dispelled whatever doubt or uncertainty might arise through 'his treatment of this subject, by his opinion in
Commonwealth v. Castellana (not yet reported) where, speaking for the
court over which he presides, he adopted the view of Justice Mitchell in
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Commonwealth v. McManus and stamped out forever all vestige in Pennsylvania of the mischievous and unfortunate language of Chief Justice
Sharswood.
Many of us have turned wearily over the pages of old Tidd, Archbold,
Troubat and Haly, and Brewster in the vain hope of finding what the
author has here given in the way of practical suggestions of a sterling
stamp. Too often have we closed these works with a realization that their
chapters smacked of the methods of the bureau and not of the field officer
who had seen active service. Of this work there can be no such criticism.
I wish that I had had at the outset of a career now near its close such
a vade mecum, and I envy the men of today who can have its daily aid. It
is the best book on practice that I know and I predict an enormous success
for the work.
Hampton L. Carson.
THE LA oR INJUNCiON.
Cincinnati, x922, pp. xiv, 197.

By John P. Frey.

Equity Publishing Co.,

That there are evils in the modern use of the injunction, particularly
with regard to labor cases, is hardly to be denied. In a recent book Mr.
Frey, of the International Molders Union, has sought to point out and array
these evils. The subject matter is so important and the problems discussed so timely that the book has attracted considerable attention.
To evaluate the book one must recognize at the very outset certain limitations on the part of the writer. Mr. Frey is not a lawyer, and in the
course of his busy, hard-working life has never had the opportunity to
acquire a legal education. One cannot be surprised, then, that in writing
ahout a difficult and highly complex legal subject, Mr. Frey should, in the
course of his examination, have fallen into errors which a well-trained
lawyer would have avoided. The book was not written as a treatise for
the guidance of those desirous of knowing the law. Its value and interest
lie rather in its revelation of the ideas of a layman of unusual intelligence,
struggling to understand the principles of judicial determination as he
watches the law in action. It is significant in its portrayal of a conception
shared by many hundreds of thousands of workers,-a conception of real
injustice wrought against workingmen today largely through the instrumentality of the labor injunction.
It is easy for a lawyer to point out errors in the book. In his discussion of the development of the injunction remedy in English labor cases, in
his contention that business is not an interest of substance to be given the
protection of law, in his apparent intimation that the right o. workers to
combine may be enjoined apart from other illegal acts, in the conception
which he works out of "government by judicial conscience' Mr. Frey will
fail to carry with him many of his readers who are versed in the law.
But after all, that is beside the point. Has Mr. Frey, in spite of evident
misconceptions, put his finger upon any of the elements of the injunction
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problem which do constitute real evils and which, therefore, hinder rather"
than further the advance of social progress?
Perhaps the most interesting charges in Mr. Frey's- indictment of the
labor injunction as used by American courts, are (j) class distinction on
the part of the courts in the issue of injunctions, (2) the vagueness and
indefiniteness of much of the language used in injunction orders, and (3)
the delay in appeal procedure. Concerning the first of these charges there
will be a wide differerce of opinion. Whether or not there is justification
for *such a widespread criticism, it must be confessed that lawygrs have
found it difficult to reconcile such cases as Wilson v. Hey, 232.IIL 389
(enjoining employes from participating in a secondary boycott) with such
cases as Macauley Brothers v. Tierney, x9 1_ I. 255, Bohn -Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. z23, or Montgomery Ward v. So. Dakota Ass'n, ixo Fed. 403
(refusing to enjoin business men from participating in similar secondary
boycotts). Mr. Frey cites numerous instances to prove his contention; but
there still remains the question whether a necessarily limited number of
isolated instances will prove convincing to those who do not share Mr.
Frey's viewpoint
One might wish that Mr. Frey had developed further his criticism
based upon the indefiniteness of the language often used in restraining orders. Courts have laid it down that "as the defendant is bound to obey the
procest of the court at his peril, the language of the injunction should in all•
cases be, so clear and explicit that an unlearned man can understand its
meaning."' It, their issue of labor injunctions too many courts have sinned
against this principle. Many- modern restraining orders bristle with such
controversial and ambiguous terms as "malicious," "threatening," "intimidating," "coercing," "picketing," "hindering," "obstructing," etc. Frequently they
are couchcd in language which, if accepted at its face value, would include
many perfectly legitimate and lawful activities. Theoretical justice may be
saved by appeal courts paring down the literal meaning of the language
through careful judicial interpretation; but workingmen are far more
vitally concerned with the law in action than with theoretical justice. If
the terms of an injunction issued against them are so ambiguous that neither
they nor a legal expert can possibly tell with certainty what conduct will be
permitted and what forbidden by the restraining terms,-if they are told by
the best legal advice that conduct presumably lawful may be legally punishable by contempt proceedings depending upon how some individual judge
may choose to interpret the questionable language of the restraining order,
they will begin to think that they are governed by men rather than by law
and their respect for our courts is not likely to be increased.
In pointing out the frequent cases of injustice to workingmen through
sweeping injunctions unjustly granted by lower courts and not vacated on
appeal until many months have passed, Mr. F rey touches upon another matter which is worthy of serious consideration. During the pendency of the
appeal, the injunction confinues in force; and due to the overcrowded
'Laurie v. Laurie, 9 Paige 234.
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dockets of many of our courts, often a sweeping injunction, containing terms
evidently not justified by the law of the state, will as a practical matter
restrain workingmen from the exercise of perfectly lawful activities until the
crisis which called them forth has long since passed. A temporary injunction was issued against the striking railway thopmen last September in terms
so sweeping that its validity has been questioned on many sides by distinguished members of the bar. The defendants immediately moved for a
dissolution of the injunction. The court denied the motion and set the
cause down for trial on May 3, 1923. By next May the issue will probably
be cold; in the -meantime, the injunction remains in force, and the employers
have succeeded in getting the courts to restrain activities during the time
of crisis which, on appeal, may be declared perfectly legitimate. Here is an
abuse which by law providing for quicker appeal procedure in labor injunction cases and possibly by one requiring the payment of damages if the
injunction is later vacated might well be remedied 5
As one concludes the reading of Mr. Frey's book, he is impressed by
the thought which must be present in the minds of nine or ten millions of
workingmen. Is there a law governing the issue of injunctions in industrial
controversies; and if so, what is it? No matter how earnestly and sincerely the workman may seek to discover the law upon which his industrial
existence and happiness largely depend, he can find it written in no single
book, nor in any language intelligible to him. Nt one, not even trained cxperts in the law, can with certainty or precision draw its outlines for him.
He sees the courts themselves often in hopeless conflict; different judges of
the same court fail to agree. Mr. Frey courageously set forth to find the.
law. He did not find it; but he-has recorded his impressions along the way.
The fair-minded critic will not agree with many of the conclusions reached
by Mr. Frey, but he will find in the book considerable food for thought.
Francis B. Sayre.
RAL?AS :-RATms, SERvicE, MANAGEMENT. By Homer Bews Vanderblue, Ph. D., Professor of Business Economics, Harvard University, and Kenneth Farwell Burgess, LL. B., of the Chicago Bar. The Macmillan Company,
New York, 1921 pp. xv, 488, including table of cases and index.

To include in one volume even a general treatment of the great phases
of our railroad problem comprised in the sub-titles "Rates," "Service,"
"Management," is not a small undertaking. The experience and achievements of the authors of this book leave no doubt that they recognize the
vastness of the field they have sought, in some measure, to cover, and the
success of their work is due in large part to a wise selection of broad and
controlling principles and tendencies from the mass of detail and cross
currents of thought and purpose which often confuse the common conception
'See Walter W. Cook, The Injunction in the Railway Strike, 32 YALE
LAw JouL
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of our transportation problem. As the preface indicates, the book is not
offered as an exhaustive treatise but is rather directed "to students approaching an intensive study of railroad practice."
The arrangement of the work proceeds upon a classification into four
"Parts": "The Scope and Machinery of Regulation," "Rates," "Service,"
"Management." The first of these grand divisions presents in the scope of
but fifty pages a very clear and enlightening history of regulation and its
agencies, touching upon the parallel and often conflicting growth of State
and Federal Commissions leading to the essential supremacy of the latter,
whose organization, functions and practice are set forth in a degree of
detail which will appeal to railroad officers and practicing attorneys even
if less useful to -readers generally. A similar inclusion of detail occurs
later, in Part II, in the description of railroad tariffs, their construction and
publication. Occasional passages of this detail character are, however, exceptions, quite in contrast with the general philosophical tone of the book.
The ever present problem of the "reasonable" rate and the difficulty of
its adjudication is made admirably clear in the early chapters of Part II:
"The requirement that rates shall be reasonable is then rather i statement
of a problem than the statement of a solution of that problem." This,
coupled with the assertion that "cost is simply not ascertainable," leads to a
discussion of the economic and business principles which so largely affect
and often control any rate structure. The negation of cost needs qualification, and is later somewhat qualified. Cost ascertainment with mathematical
accuracy is douibtless impossible, but the science of railroad cost accounting
has made notable progress in the past decade and in cases concerning a
general structure of rates on such commodities as ore; coke and coal, "cost
studies" are likely to form a major item of the evidence, pertinent in an
increasing degree and undoubtedly having material effect upon the conclusion. Nevertheless, the public misconception that exact cost is easily
ascertained, and the belief that it should furnish the measure of rate, calls
for enlightenment which is admirably given in the discussion of "Equalization," "Distance," "Group Rates" and the familiar but misunderstood principle of "What the traffic will bear."
The most notable portion of the discussion of rates deals with "General
Rate Levels." Here the work passes from an exposition of existing experience to contemplation of the new era of regulation inaugurated by the
Transportation Act of i92o. Here is traced the progress from the repudiation in i91o of the strengthening of railroad credit as a justification for
higher rate levels, to the complete acceptance by the Commission in 19"2 of
"the responsibility of adjusting rate levels to the revenue needs of the carriers."
Part III, dealing with service, touches a field heretofore less written of
than rates. Here again is traced the development of Federal and state control, the former marked by sound caution and conservatism, the latter, not
seldom, extreme, unwise and unjust. The impression given that the worst
phase of conflicting and capricious state requirements is past, is, it is to be
hoped, correct. There is made clear the vast responsibility and intricacy of
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actual railroad management and operation and the fact that control of these
matters "has not now been assumed by the regulating power." The Transportation Act of 192o again opens a new era of service regulation particularly
in the matters of compulsory construction, car service and train movement,
raising many questions to be settled only by experience, and the courts. I-he
impressive list of achievements of private management for improved service,
including such matters as standard gauge and time, interchange, Master Car
Builders Rules, and the important work of the American Railway Association serves to remind the reader that all progress in America is not the
child of legislation.
Under the general head of "Management" are included a somewhat heterogeneous group of subjects not dealt with directly in discussing rates and
service. Chapters are devoted to Valuation, Labor Disputes, Accounts and
Consolidation as well as to a phase, sometimes overlooked, "The Protection
of Inventors." Each subject is well treated, if, from the nature of the case,
conclusions are lacking.
The book as a whole gives a competent conception of America's contribution to the science of government in regulating railroads. In addition to
what has been achieved, the reader is ever reminded of the vast problems
yet unsolved and the new era born with the Transportation Act of 192o.
The book contains and imparts information and inspires thought in the
thoughtful reader. The authors well term it a record of "thoughtful observations." It is well worth the careful reading of all who are touched
by our railroad problem.
Frederic L. Ballard.

THE LAw oF CITY PLANNING AND ZONING. By Frank Backus Williams.
The Macmillan Company, New York, ixg2, pp. xvii, 738.

Cities in this country and Europe have until recent times been permitted
to develop without any particular regulation, each individual owner of
property erecting such improvements as fancy or the desire for profit might
prompt. It is now recognized that some restriction must be imposed and
some active effort developed in order that cities may be made in any reasonable degree, livable, healthful and beautiful. Left to themselves, the
members of a community of men in thickly populated areas will inevitably
produce conditions objectionable from every point of view. We accordingly
have city planning and city zoning, and laws enacted for such planning and
city zoning.
Mr. Williams has collected the various laws which have been enacted
on the subject in this country and Europe, and has arranged them under
several headings in a fashion which lays every student-of the subject under
deep obligation to him; comprehensive tables of statutes, index of cases, index of statutes, and general index making the contents easily accessible.
The important detisions of the courts are referred to and discussed, but
the book is not in any sense a technical law treatise. The development of
city planning and zoning in some of the more important cities of the world
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is referred to in much detail, and many topics of great interest are developed.
Among the latter is the difference between the exercise of eminent domain in
this country and in Europe. No thinker can fail to come to the conclusion
that the constitutional provisions in the United States are too restrictive and
unduly protect individual property inierests against the interests of the community at large.
The book is well worth careful study, and will prove an invaluable
handbook to those interested in this department of civic improvement.
Roland R. Faulke.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE )EVELOPMENT oF LAw. Modern Legal Philosophy.
Series, Vol. XIII. By Pierre de Tourtoulon, translated by Martha 3&C.
Read, New York.." The Macmillan Company, i9W2, pp. lxi, 653.

"A little scepticism will render him [the judge] more scrupulous, more
indulgent to every one and consequently more just" (487). "One may ask
oneself whether a little scepticism would not have spared humanity many
sorrows" (53o). "It [the philosophy of chance] inspires a salutary scepticism; not that of negation, but that of prudence-the kindly, scrupulous and
searching scepticism, which might well be the best instrument of progress
for humanity" (634).
These quotations from Tourtoulon's book give us a measure of the
author's point of view. He is a very wise man and a sceptic. He is a
keen analyst and not carried away by words or sentiment. He knows the
difference between what isscientific and what is not, and his standard is very
high. But he is not sure that scientific truth always is the thing to follow
in law or politics. "We construct," he says, "upon the most absurd axioms,
reasonable, practical, and sometimes even ingenious institutions" (290). "It
is certain that a mistake or a blunder does not inevitably occasion unhappiness and the truth happiness. There are instances where lies may bring
happy results." (ii.)
The book under review is intended by the author as an introduction to
a legal history, "to a juristic history of modern Europe." Accordingly Tourtoulon discusses one after another all the possible questions of a general nature that may be asked about the history and development of law. Each
discussion may be regarded as almost 4 monograph in itself. For the author
analyzes the given concept in its broadest aspect before he applies it to the
law. Thus to take an example, every philosophic lawyer would like to know,
if he could, whither we can explain the origin, history and development of
the law as the result of a deliberate attempt of human individuals and groups
to realize certain ends. To state the same things in technical terms, Is the
history of law a teleological discipline? To answer the question, TourtouIon analyzes the concept of teleology in general, and in various specific applications. Then he discusses teleology in the law. The author's benevolent
scepticism leads him to state the argumnents for and against any theory with
the c ompletest impartiality, though he may sometimes seem paradoxical. The
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paradox seems forced from him by an unusual insight into the facts. The
book is extremely refreshing and exhilarating. There is an openness of
mind that is wholly commendable. The book is long and treats of a great
many topics. It is out of the question to touch upon all of them in this
brief review. My purpose will be, by a few selected references, to give the
reader an idea what a wealth of wisdom and clear and dispassionate thought
the book contains.
The author does not believe in teleology in the development of law because we do not know the purposes of institutions- The best that we can do
is to study the functions of laws, though here, too, "the greatest jurist, has
only very vague ideas concerning the services that the laws which he expounds render to society. . . . The first step toward wisdom is the knowledge that we are ignorant of nearly all of the functions of our laws, or of
the evil or the good which they may bring us" (24). He admits that man
intervenes in the creation of the law, and that his will has considerable
influence, but whether that influence is all-powerful, whether it is in accordance with his foresight and desires is another question. Man rarely foresees
the actual result of a proposed law; hence we cannot speak of -an end or
purpose, but of a limit, a point of arrival. By experience, however, we may
at least improve the method of realizing our purpose in a new law. But
when all is said and done, "the law is not the human will realized."
Does the law act as a selective agency in favoring persons enddwed with
certain meritorious qualities? The author's answer is that juridical selection
and elmination can work in all directions. "The law intervenes in the struggle for existence to eliminate sometimes those who possess a certain quality.
And the differsometimes those who possess the opposite quality" (114).
ent departments of the law must be examined in relation to this question, for
they need not all necessarily have the same effect. One seems to hear
Thrasymachus speaking in the following sentence: "Historically, the idea of
justice is primarily a ruse which clever and cynical peoples employ to deceive more idealistic, and, for that reason, weaker peoples" (xis). "The
idea of justice is consequently an instrument of selection which may favor
.
indifferently practical men or idealists." (ib.)
There is a very interesting chapter entitled "Diseases of Thought and
Legal Development." By diseases of thought the author means certain
kinds of error in our thinking which, to judge from their universality,
seem to be of the essence of real human thought. They are necessary, he
says, and it would be impossible to abolish them. They play the part of a
social and intellectual function. He names as the principal types, credulity,
language myths, historical myths, fashion. It is in this. connection that he
points out that truth in itself is neither good nor evil. "The true and
the good are two ways of imagining things and between them there is no
necessary relationship." "The development of the law has been directed in
great part by forces which are logically defective" (289). "The myth gives
people enthusiasm. It permits a great deal of talking, writing and acting
with a minimum of thinking, and brings sometimes, though not always, good
results. Examples of such myths are "the sovereignty of divine law" myth,
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the "social function" myth, the "solidarity" myth, and so ,n. "Irrational
intellectuality is one of the most fruitful sources of the law. In my opinion
it is certain that the legal philosophy of the future will find there its
most substantial bases" (30o).

In discussing what he calls "general positive law," by which he seems
to mean the same thing as is called "jurisprudence" by Holland, -he makes a
valuable distinction between the general elements of law and the necessary
elements. All necessary elements are, of course, general, but not vice versa.
In this connection he remarks: "Up to the present time no one has concerned himself with anything except what was common to' every juridical
This is scarcely true. Stammler, in his
system of the past or present" (4i).
several works, and especially in his "Thcorie der Rcchtszwissenschaft". undertakes to define law and to derive from the definitions the categories of
law, not by the inductive method of observing what is common to the various
systems of law, but by an a priori method of discovering a certain mode of
human consciousness, getting 'therefrbm the elements of the legal concept (I
mean the concept of what law is), and then by a purely logical process deriving from the definition or concept of law the necessary legal categories.
Tourtoulon is quite correct when he says that "the necessity of a juridical
idea, the impossibility of its contrary, cannot result from experience." Hence
the experimental and inductive method, as well as that of observation, abstraction and generalization, cannot be employed. "Sanction" is an example
of such categorical necessaries in law.
In studying the history of law and comparative law we use the inductive
method of observation, for the purpose of discovering certain general truths.
The author asks the interesting question, Can inductive juridical propositions become experimental truths? (431). His answer is qualified. What
determines an experimental, scientific truth is the possibility and facility of
testing and verifying the statement. The social sciences are very imperfectly experimental, because of the difficulty of verification of theses by
others than the author. The one who would undertake the verification must
go through the same amount of work as the author, and more besides, in
order to see if the author has neglected any observations. Nevertheless,
verification is not impossible. and a great many points in the history of law
may be considered as verified by experiment, as, for example, the existence of
matriarchy.
Is the knowledge of the past that we thus acquire of practical value?
Tourtoulon analyzes the situation and gives a negative answer. Experience,
he says, is good advice; but it is not correct to say, Experience gives us
scientific directions which we ought to follow. For in the first place, the
specific conditions into which the institution or law is to be introduced is a
new factor. In the second place, we can not tell the secondary, tertiary and
so on, effects of a given reform. And in the third place, even if we could
know all this, no state of knowledge can scientifically impose a state of will.
And in the sequel the author calls attention to the way in which inductive
generalizations of social facts which may be sound enough are changed by
insensible transitions into principles of morality. Thus one starts with the

BOOK REVIEWS
proposition, "Men live in society," which is perfectly true, and ends up with
the statement, "The aim of the life of the individual is to contribute to the
development of the social body," which is far from being a scientific statement, and may easily be denied. Morcover if the last proposition is intended as imposing an obligation, it can never be logically derived from the
statement of a fact. Most if not all of the books dealing with natural law
by advocates of that doctrine, such as Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, Lorimer,
are guilty of this fallacy.
Sound is also the author's view that an experimental definition of the
law is impossible because it leads to a vicious circle. What is found*.in
juridical facts and not in non-juridical is law. But in order to separate
juridical facts fro.a non-juridical, we must know what law is; A conventional definition he rejects because everything that is built upon a conventional basis is bound to be conventional and hence devoid of interest.
Here it is not clear that one need agree with the author's statement.
His objection that thq agreement among dialecticians or dialectical jurists
on any conventional definition of law is more apparent than real is not
serious. For as long as one jurist is in agreement with himself on a definition of the law, he can establish a useful system upon it, which. should not be
devoid of interest. This does -not mean that one is free to give any definition
to law that he pleases. The conception of law, though vague and indefinite,
is one that has grown up semi-consciously in the course of social existence.
There is a vague general agreement as to its meaning and all that the jurist
has to do is to make the notion precise. Thus the definition is both experimental and conventional. It is experimental because the jurist picks out for
study those facts which, by general consensus are termed juridical and by a
study of these facts he establishes a definition. It is conventional, because the
jurist must assume a vague and unprecise definition as already existing in the
general consciousness, which is the result of convention, though, forced upon
the human mind by the situation, natural and social. Conventional need
not mean arbitrary. Are not all definitions partly conventional and partly
experimental? And therein is the solution of the objection of arguing in a
circle. However, Tourtoulon is in agreement with Stammler an this point
that the specificity of the law is not experimental or conventional, but categorical, in the same way that quality and quantity are categorical in "their
nature. Law "plays the same part in society that the verb or the adjective
does in language. It is a form necessary to the understanding of all society" (46r). This is all true, but what was said before of the definition
of law may be said here of verb" and adjective.
The first categorical truth, then, according to our author, is the lawidea (specificity of the law). "The distinction between juridical functions,
between private law, public law, criminal law, etc., between real rights and
personal rights-all of these form so many branches of the categorical
syntax of the law" (462).
The author's discussion of justice, its relation to law and to morality,
is very illuminating and suggestive, though there is ample room for difference
of opinion. Justice, he maintains, is absolutely necessary to law, though it is
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not a logical or scientific, but a metaphysical concept. Metaphysical he denominates those "forms of intellectual labor which can legitimately lead only
to hypothetical solutions" (477). It is, however, "the highest order of
thought and one without which human civilization would be a trifling matter" (ib.). Justice, to be of any value, must be immutable and hence transcendent, not, however, necessarily implying theism. Metaphysical law is
justice, morality is goodness. The good and the just are not identical. They
may be opposed. Slavery may some time have been good, it was never just.
For justice is correctly defined by the expression "suum cuique," to every one
his own. "Let us leave," he says in his characteristic manner, "to humanity the illusion that the legislator can always be just and good at the same
time." Logically it is not true (486). Positive law is different from metaphysical law. The former has order as its aim, not justice. It "draws its
inspiration from the just, but it follows quite as readily, and according to
circumstances, the directions of the useful, of the moral,..and even that of
prejudice" (489). "Metaphysical law is not an ideal positive or Utopian
law, but a science of simple logic. It does not propose to seek what 'ought
to be,' a formula void of any logical meaning, but what conforms to, or does
not conform to, the 'suum cuique" (491-2). From justice as thus defined
we carn derive logically other ideas, such as liberty and others besides of a,
concrete character. Legal philosophers, he says, confuse the metaphysical
basis of law (justice) with its justification. An unjust law may be justfied.
Laws of prohibition are unjust as a restraint on personal liberty, but they
may be justified if the dangers of alcohol are a great menace to the community.
There are many other important discussions of philosophical and- psychological problems having a bearing on the law, which render the book valuable
as a distinct contribution of a fresh nature to the theory of law. To get an
adequate idea of the importance of the book, the reader is advised to scan
its pages carefully.
The translator has done her task on the whole rather cieditably if one
may judge of a translation without having consulted the original. But there
is room for improvement in a number of respects. The proofreading was
done poorly. We find "casuality" for "causality" twice at least (2o4), "reason d'itre" (623), "de [a giurns prudensa" (640), "Picard" for "Picavet"
(52o), and many other disfiguring misprints. We notice "observation" used
in the sense of "observance" (p. lix). There are quite a number of instances of badly constructed, or unintelligible sentences. Thus, "What
periodicals, parliamentary treatises and lawyers' speeches, what collections of
decisions and judgments, might never have sprung from this colossal, semiintellectual activity if it had to be submitted to the strict rules of logicl"
(291). "Before entering upon a discussion on a point of logic propound
this question to one's (sic) antagonist" (454). "But this estate . . .
ought to be granted to every 'cuique' being" (495)- "Now on the Sabbath
day, the Hebrews are forbidden to carry their bundles the same as upon
other days of the week" (523). This sentence is not clear. But what the
author meant to say is no doubt that on the Sabbath a bundle had to be
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carried in a different manner than on the other days of the week. "But if it
may not be necessary to insist on this, it is quickly apparent that the mathematics" are especially rich in concepts of this sort since its elements, the
most simple to the most complex-point, line, surface, infinity, space of is
dimensions, V x and that the bases of all reasoning, the categories-cause,
quantity, quality, relation-have no actual existence whatever" (646). "But
the old deterministic metaphor in which man plays the part of a balance,
where his thoughts, desires and beliefs are forces foreign to him, externally

produced and weighed in some scales or other, cause his decision, is also
abandoned" (30). Here and there is noticeable what is, no doubt, a mistranslation of the French text, or a literal translation which gives poor sense
or no sense in English. Thus, on p. 42r, end, we read, "Thus observation
cannot (sic) end in an induction, but is satisfied to note the facts just
as they have successively occurred." Here "cannot" must be a mistake for
"may not." "The ideal of Greek thinkers is to bring the law under the rule
of the harmony, the equilibrium and the moderation, which though distinct
from logical justice seem to resemble it somewhat" (513). Here the three
definite articles which I italicized, are clearly literal translations of the
French which make no sense in English. There are also peculiar translations
of Latin expressions. Thus "recedi posse a voluntate parentis" is translated "you can well yield to the will of a parent" (316). The meaning can
only be "to be able to depart from the will of the parent." "Eo quod super
cause stati profcrebantur" is rendered "because they were brought upon the
suit standing for hearing" (342). The correct translation is "because they
were brought forward concerning the status or condition of the cause."
Isaac Hsik.
THE CONTROL OF A.aRTCAN FoREiGN Ra.ATioxs. By Quincy Wright,
Ph. D., Professor of International Law in the University of Minnesota. The
MacMillan Co., 1922, pp. xxvi, 412.
This work is a revision and expansion of an essay of similar title with
which the author won the Henry M. Phillips prize of $2ooo, offered by the
American Philosophical Society, in 5921. It is essentially a treatise on
foreign affairs in American constitutional law, and on the resulting conflict
of constitutional and international law.
It presents in systematic detail the problems of a government which is
controlled by a written constitution, under whose terms the responsibility and
power to conduct foreign relations is divided among several agencies, and yet
is held responsible as a whole, diplomatically and legally, by the other sovereign states with which it associates in the Society of Nations. "Constitutional law defines the powers of the organs which conduct American foreign
relations; international law defines their responsibilities."
The book states in clear and detailed fashion the. respective shares of
the President, the President and Senate, and the House of Represefitatives.
in our making of t13ties and conducting foreign affairs, and outlines with
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equal care and detail our responsibilities as a nation to other powers, the
ways in which they may properly expect to deal with our government, and
the limited extent to which they must know and make allowances for our
governmental machinery.
In exhaustively discussing the subject first from the international and
then from the constitutional side, a certain amount of repetition was inevitable, but such a method is certainly defensible because of the gain in
clearness and precision,--qualities most desirable when presenting involved
questions in a treatise designed for college and law school textbook use.
The constructive part of Professor Wright's work is the development
of the topic of what he calls "constitutional understandings." Evidently, in a
government whose powers with reference to foreign relations are divided,
and which must still present a united front to foreign nations a policy of
"give and take" between the varied agencies having unquestioned rights is
essential.
Some of these "constitutional understandings" are already in
being; others are suggested.
When the powers of two departments overlap, making possible contrary
action on the same occasion, the way to harmony lies in the development of
an understanding that each department should so exercise its concurrent
powers as not to impair the validity of action already taken by the other
department, without that department's consent. Here the legal principle that
the most recent exercise of concurrent power prevails can be helped by such
an understanding.
Where action contemplated by any independent department requires the
co-operation of another independent department for its carrying out, the advice
of that department ought to be sought before the action is taken. Where
such action has already been constitutionally taken, the department whose
co-operation is required ought to perform the necessary acts, even though its
advice has not been asked, or if asked has not been followed. (Is not this
a "counsel of perfection"? Though, to be sure, in practice the House of
Representatives, despite grumbling, may be counted on to pass enabling
legislation.)
It is the duty of all organs of the government to aid in meeting international responsibilities, the author argues. Congress has power under the
"necessary and proper" clause to provide for meeting international responsibilities, and it is under a clear obligation to provide the instrumentalities for
doing so. The President is under a duty "to take care that the laws (including the law of nations) be faithfully executed," which helps to a certain extent
Recent history gives point to the suggestion that the power to confirm
treaties be taken by constitutional amendment from two-thirds of'the Senate,
and given to a simple majority in both houses of Congress. Such a plan
would facilitate treaties running the gauntlet of Senatorial scrutiny, and
soothes the injured feelings of the House, now often asked to pass enabling
legislation as a matter of duty, for treaties in whose making it had no
voice.
A very novel and stimulating idea presented is that the conduct of
foreign affairs would be better harmonized and unified, and the ratification
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of treaties facilitated, if we had a special cabinet for foreign affairs, consisting of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, Treasury and Commerce, the
Attorney-General, the Vice-President, the Speaker of the House, the President pro tern of the Senate, and the chairmen of the Foreign Relations and
Foreign Affairs Committees.

Donald L. Stone.
THE NEw CONSTITUTXONS

OF EUROPE.

By Howard Lee McBain and

Lindsay Rogers, New York, Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922, pp. ix, 612.
Never in the history of the world has there been so much constitution-making as in these post-war years. The entire political systems of the
countries of Europe from the Rhine 'eastward have been overturned and
rebuilt, and the main outlines of the new structures, the 'skeletons or framework formulated in written constitutions. To Americans this latter process
was the logical step after the destruction of the old governments. The
United States set the example for written constitutions in the eighteenth century. France promptly followed and in the course of the next century, from
1789 to 187o; developed a new constitution with each successive change in
her government. Other peoples adopted the fashion, and written constitutions
marked the founding of all the new European States in the last hundred
years. It was, therefore, to be expected that the "Founding Fathers" of the
new States should lay great stress on constitutional conventions and the
definite formulation of the fundamental law. The value and significance
of this to ihe historian is evident and it would have been a real contribution
to our subject to have had the results brought together in one convenient
volume. But the authors of this work have done much more. They have
not only furnished excellent translations of the text of the constitutions of
ten of the new States-Germany, Prussia, Austria, Czecho-slovakia, Jugoslavia, Russia, Poland, Danzig, Esthonia and Finland and three of the
older ones-Belgium, Italy and France-but they have supplied the critical'
and the hisiorical apparatus for the study and appreciation of them.
Prefaced to the separate constitutions are excellent historical introductions that will be most welcome to the average reader and student. They
set out clearly the successive steps in the political development that led to
the adoption of the constitution. The distinctly original contribution, however, is in the illuminating and interesting discussion (pp. 1-164). of the
theory and principles of political structure of the present day. It contributes
the most suggestive and up-to-the-minute treatment of the subject extant;
succinct, scholarly and readable. No student of political history can afford
to overlook it.
The very chapter headings challenge one's interest, as for example,
"Princes and Parliaments," "Legislatures and Bureaucrats," "Proportional
Representation," "Secondary Chambers" and "Democrats and Diplomats."
In the chapter entitled "Individualism and Socialism" the authors review the
different aspects of this basic problem of democracy in the light of the most
recent experiments in socialization. The treatment is both sound and original.
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The discussion of the "Second Chamber," humorously and with greater

accuracy called the "Secondary Chamber" by the authors, is greatly strength"ened
by the publication- in' the Appendix (pp. 573ff) of
the Report of the
Conference on ihe Reform of the Second Chamber to the Prime Minister by
Viscount Jbrycg in 1918. In both, the Second Chamber comes in for severe
handling. The fiction that it represents the sober and mature second thought
of the nation is scouted. Even our Senate seems to arouse suspicions on
that core. At any rate the founders of the new European States were not
greatly impressed with -the idea. In general they retained the Second Chamber, but as in England and France it is depressed into a secondary position. Various devices, are -resorted to -ta secure a reasonable basis for representation.
The Introduction -of the social and economic matter into the fundamental law constitutes a novel departure from the classical constitutions of the
past hundred years. Not only are the Bill of Rights considerably extended
to make room for the new ideas on the rights of society, but in cases, entire sections on this subject occur. Thus the German document devotes the
entire Fifth Section to "Economic Life."
The authors also point out the manifest failure to provide effective control over the conduct of foreign affairs. The problem of "Secret Diplomacy" still awaits solution despite the much heralded "Open covenants openly
arrived at," and the reviewer heartily recommends the chapter on "Democrats
and Diplomats."
Some of the constitutions were available in English before, others, like
the Prussian and the Finnish are here given for the first time. In a subsequent edition of the work the Irish and Turkish constitutions would make
valuable additions, possibly those of Latvia and Esthonia also. Somewhat
more stress on economic and social factors in the introductory sketch to
the treatment of the German and the Russian constitutions would be advisable.
In conclusion attention should again be called to the fact that the
authors' aim was chiefly to "furnish material for study rather than a
fabricated product." In this they have succeeded much better than is usually
the case in the publication of source materials. They furnish not only the
translations of the constitutions, their historic setting and a helpful bibliography in the footnotes, but a discussion of political theory and practice on
moot questions of national organization, which is of an unusually high order of excellence. Teachers and students of European History and Government are greatly indebted for so admirable an aid in their work.
William E. Lingelbach.
INTERPRETATioiis or IxnAL Hismio y.
Co., New York, 1923, pp. xiv, 171.

By Roscoe Pound.

The Macmillan

This volume comprises a series of lectures delivered by Dean Pound at
Trinity College, Cambridge in 1922 describing and criticising the principal
tendencies of historical jurisprudence in the nineteenth century. The legal
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thought of that century was to a great extent in revolt against the natural
law theories of the preceding period and the superficiality and cocksureness
that characterized the era of codification. Under the impetus given by
Savigny, coupled with the general interest in scientific research, historical
studies became the fashion, investigation of the sources of law the chief
outlet for juristic energy. But the unification of the results of such researches called for interpretations and deductions, and the result of these
deductions have had no slight influence upon nineteenth century law. An
analysis of the rise, growth and decline of these theories is the task of the
learned author, and he has dealt with the subject with characteristic originality and penetration. Among the interpretations of legal history discussed, four are particularly important, the ethical, the political, the positivist,
and the economic. Finally the author gives his own interpretation which he
describes as an engineering interpretation. Jurisprudence is a science of
social engineering; its task "an elimination of friction and precluding of
waste, so far as possible, in the satisfaction of infinite human desires out of
a relatively finite store of material goods of existence." This is a method
rather than an interpretation, but concededly, the author's view corresponds
closely to the civilization theory of Kohler, although Dean Pound is too
much of a pragmatist to accept the Hegelian cast of Kohler's interpretation.
"Pragmatism," he says, "sees validity in actions, not in that they realize the
idea, but to the extent that they( are effective for their purpose and in purposes to the extent that they satisfy a maximum of human demands."
Packed in very small space this short book contains much food for
thought. It will surprise many to discover upon what slender foundations
some doctrines rest that impressed themselves strongly on the last generation; such, for example, as Sir Henry S. Maine's generalization of progress
as a movement from status to contract. In this connection may we not trace
the doctrine of self-determination of small nations, that agitates present-day
Europe, to that theory of historical jurisprudence which found the end of law

in the securing of the maximum of individual self-assertion. It is characteristic of the legal profession, especially of those members in active practice, to

affect a dislike for theory and a regard for what has the appearance of being
practical; Anglo-American law in particular has prided itself upon its empir-

ical development. No doubt this method has given it the toughness that
delighted Maitland. But "what are abstract ideas in the hands of philosophers
get a concrete content when they come into the hands of lawyers," and
muddled thinking on fundamental problems has led to many unfortunate
decisions, especially in the field of constitutional law. For this reason, if for
no other, a work of this kind is stimulating and serviceable to teacher and
judge and to those members of the bar who may be interested in the progress
of jurisprudence at home and abroad, and this, although one may differ from
the author on various matters of detail in a field so large and controversial.
Possibly some readers, born in the last century, may wonder at what
seems, at least by implication, a slightly contemptuous attitude towards the
author's distinguished predecessors of the historical school, attributing to them
a juristic pessimism, a disbelief in the utility of effort for the improvement of

